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Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning
Rafael Palomino



Knowledge of speech, but not of silence;
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word.
- T. S. Eliot1
I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he fate of great words,” in their constant wandering, “appears to
be their progressive dispersion in different directions, so that, in the end,
neither detractors nor epigones know exactly what they are referring to in
their diatribes or panegyrics.”2
In examining the changing dynamic of the religious phenomenon in
postmodern societies, legal studies have invented or imported a
considerable number of terms that offer only the illusion of scientific
precision. Grand words that inspire immediate acceptance and a sense of
security include the following: equality, nondiscrimination, liberty, and
secularism. However, after this gratifying first impression, the jurist will
take it upon himself to engage in a closer study to assess the scope, the
ultimate implications, and the specific ramifications that such terms
entail in reality. And in doing so, unsurprisingly, both “detractors [and]
epigones” can lose sight of the underlying meaning, which is ultimately
adapted to the claims and propositions being debated.
Neutrality faces this same danger of turning into an “empty”
signifier, or, alternatively, a word too “full” of meanings. For this reason,
embarking on an analysis of the concept in relation to religion is a
worthwhile endeavor. To do so, this Article proposes two explorations—
one in the world of political science and law and another in the world of
law—of western legal texts from a wide range of traditions, combining

. Professor of Law at Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain); researcher at The
Human Rights Institute of Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain); member of the Advisory
Council of the ODHIR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief (OSCE); associate
member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Law.
1. T.S. ELIOT, Choruses from the Rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 147 (1963).
2. Rafael Navarro-Valls, Volver a Pensar la Laicidad, 0 ILU. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS DE LAS
RELIGIONES
157, 157 (1995), available at http://www.ucm.es/BUCM/revistas/ccr/
11354712/articulos/ILUR9595110157A.PDF.
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an appraisal of case law and academic theory. At the same time, through
these varied explorations, this Article will attempt to elucidate the
specific function—if one exists—of neutrality in the complex system of
state relations with religious beliefs. This will allow for a reflection on
the scope of neutrality, a concept that, as will be shown, has something in
it of myth as well as being a principle of state action in relation to the
religious factor.
To this end, Part II analyzes the emerging role of the term
“neutrality” in legal studies by taking a comparative approach to state
law on religious affairs. Part III addresses the use of the term “neutrality”
in the law, beginning with a general approach to the original meaning of
the term in international law. Part IV briefly explains the influence of
liberal ideology in crafting the meaning of legal neutrality in dealing
with religion or beliefs. Part V tries to elucidate the meaning of neutrality
as a principle in the law of several countries. Part VI will focus on the
role of neutrality in academics. The Article concludes with remarks
concerning the meaning of neutrality, its role as a legal principle, and its
mythical character.
II. NEUTRALITY AS AN EMERGING TERM IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
STATE AND RELIGION
To introduce the topic, a very general definition of the concept of
neutrality is needed. Neutrality designates the quality or attitude of one
who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict. In the legal world, as
will be shown, the concept of neutrality made its first appearance in
international law.3
Neutrality appears in state law on religious affairs to the extent that
the recognition of the fundamental right of religious freedom appears to
entail an obligation on the state that may be specifically defined as
“neutrality.”4 The religious neutrality of the state is asserted in this sense
in numerous geo-legal contexts. Merely by way of example, this
religious neutrality appears in decisions by the Italian Constitutional
Court,5 the Spanish Constitutional Court,6 the German Federal
3. See infra Part III.
4. “[Article] 9 of the Convention . . . guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, including the freedom not to belong to a religion, and . . . imposes on Contracting States a
‘duty of neutrality and impartiality.’” Lautsi v. Italy, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06, ¶ 60,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/ lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf.
5. See Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235, (It.), http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/
actionPronuncia.do (search for case number 235 for year 1997).
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Constitutional Court,7 the U.S. Supreme Court,8 and the European Court
of Human Rights.9 Moreover, its importance is asserted as an obligation
upon state authorities and officials,10 and it is stressed as a “basic value”
in the minimum international criteria for religious freedom.11
Religious neutrality appears together with other terms such as
impartiality, separation, independence, and autonomy. The question that
arises is whether it is really necessary to introduce so many concepts,
including the notion of religious neutrality, given that its implications are
already stipulated in the principles of religious equality and secularism.
Might it simply be a new way of referring to established categories, an
old wine in new wineskins?12 It certainly might seem this way at first
glance; nevertheless, various reasons illustrate the value of making use of
the concept of neutrality as an advantageous alternative. A few of these
reasons are considered below.
The first is the justification that might be called the “language
barrier.”13 The Western legal worlds—basically the Anglo-American

6. See S.T.C., June 2, 2004 (No. 101) (Spain), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/
en/jurisprudencia/Pages/Sentencia.aspx?cod=8300 (“In its objective dimension, religious freedom
entails a twofold demand, referred to in art. 16.3 CE: first, the neutrality of public authorities,
inherent to the non-confessionalism of the State; second, the maintenance of relations of cooperation
between public authorities and the various churches. In this regard, we previously stated in STC
46/2001, February 15, FJ 4, that ‘art. 16.3 of the Constitution, after setting forth a declaration of
neutrality (STC 340/1993, November 16, and 177/1996, of November 11), considers the religious
component perceptible in Spanish society and orders the public authorities to maintain “the
consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations”, thereby
introducing a notion of non-confessionalism or positive secularism that “prohibits any kind of
confusion between religious and State functions” (STC 177/1996, November 11).’”).
7. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 2
BvR
1436/02
(Ger.),
available
at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20030924_2bvr143602en.html; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] June 26, 2002, 1 BvR 670/91 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rs20020626_ 1bvr067091en.html.
8. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
9. See Hasan v. Bulgaria, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (2000); Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 387 (1996); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 397 (1993).
10. Eur. Consult. Ass., Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, Res. 1743 ¶ 16 (2010),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedTExt/
ta10/ERES1743.htm.
11. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] & The Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR] Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief, Sept. 28,
2004, at 11, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/13993.
12. Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve, Liberalism and Neutrality, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
1 (Robert E. Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989).
13. The “language barrier” is a common difficulty in dealing with comparative law that
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tradition and the Continental European tradition—are moving ever closer
together as a result of the constitutional demands imposed by human
rights and the interdependence arising from globalization.14 “[T]he
techniques and mechanisms of law are often very different from one
country to the next, but . . . the actual solutions, the responses to problems,
and the legal sensibility are more or less the same.”15 However, language
can throw up barriers that prevent or hinder the analysis of common
problems and solutions. An example of this issue is the word laicidad, a
Spanish word that does not exist in the English language. Its nearequivalent would be the term “secularism,” but secularism does not relate
exactly to the principle of laicidad, but to laicism as an ideological
choice.16 The French word laïcité has no exact translation, and when
employed in English directly evokes the French system of relations
between the state and religions.17 On the other hand, the word “neutrality”
is a term used by English speakers in a sense to identify the principle of
laicidad.18 If the same word existed in Romance and Germanic languages,
this equivalence would offer clear advantages for a joint study of
approaches to the religious factor in different legal traditions.
The second justification, more complex than the first, relates to the
semantic deflation suffered by the term laicidad. A balanced approach to
the concept of laicidad requires a certain degree of caution. Friedrich von
Hayek pointed out the perversion of language in what he referred to as

academics often reference. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH 142 (1971); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2009); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Foreword: Comparative Law in the Late
Twentieth Century, 1987 BYU L. REV. 325, 327.
14. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
15. JEAN CARBONNIER, DERECHO FLEXIBLE 197 (1974).
16. See Iain T. Benson, Considering Secularism, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN A SECULAR
SOCIETY 83–98 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004).
17. See, e.g., OLIVIER ROY, SECULARISM CONFRONTS ISLAM xii (George Holoch trans.,
2007); Lorenzo Zucca, The Crisis of the Secular State—A reply to Professor Sajó, 7 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 494 (2009).
18. “Governmental religious neutrality is attained when government does not influence its
citizens’ choices for or against certain religious or secular systems of belief, either by imposing
burdens on them or by granting advantages to them. Instead, government is neutral when it is
evenhanded toward people of all faiths and of none.” John T.S. Madeley, European Liberal
Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality, in CHURCH AND STATE IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY 7 (John T.S. Madeley & Zsolt Enyedi
eds., 2003) (quoting STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF
PLURALISM 10 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“weasel words,”19 a phrase inspired by an old Norse myth that attributes
to the weasel an ability to suck out the contents of an egg without
breaking its shell. Hayek noted the possibility of emptying words of their
content, or of stripping them of their meaning, so that only the signifier
remains.20 This is similar to what has happened to the word laicidad.21
The reasons for this perversion are explained below.
In France, for example, there have been attempts to clarify the
terminology, resulting in the use of laïcité du combat22 to designate the
outdated, intolerant French secularism,23 as opposed to laïcité ouverte,24
which is what is sought in France today,25 and on which the Canadian
system is predicated.26 Turkey, meanwhile, would define a form of
laicidad that acts as a breakwater against the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism.27 In Italy, faced with the difficulty of applying an oldfashioned French-style laicidad, in academic circles it has been deemed
necessary to undertake the task of ripensare la laicità.28 In short, in light
of this polysemy and its concomitant political confusion, it has been
suggested that laicidad might simply end up becoming a “useless legal
concept.”29

19. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 221 (Edward Feser ed., 2006).
20. Id.
21. Luis Prieto Sanchís, Religión y Política (A Propósito del Estado Laico), 53 PERSONA Y
DERECHO 113, 115 (2005).
22. Laïcité du combat means an aggressive or hostile detachment of the State from religion or
beliefs, particularly from institutional religion and more specifically from the Catholic Church.
23. Martin Rhonheimer, Democrazia Moderna, Stato Laico e Missione Spirituale della
Chiesa: Spunti per una Concezione Politica “Sana della Laicità”, in LAICITÀ: LA RICERCA
DELL’UNIVERSALE NELLE DIFFERENZE 101 (Pierpaolo Donati ed., 2008).
24. Fernando Rey, La Laicidad ‘A la Francesa’, ¿Modelo o Excepción?, 53 PERSONA Y
DERECHO 385, 395 (2005). Laïcité ouverte means a separation between church and state which
admits some kind of relation between institutional religion or belief and the state, or recognizes a
role of religion in public life, in the daily life of a given country, in its traditions, etc.
25. Miguel Angel Jusdado, El Sentido Moderno del Laicismo Francés, 104 NUEVA REVISTA
DE POLÍTICA, CULTURA Y ARTE 66 (Marzo–Abril 2006).
26. Gérard Bouchard & Charles Taylor, Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques
d’Accommodement Reliées aux Différences Culturelles, BUILDING THE FUTURE : FINAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION, 2008, available at http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/ index-en.html.; María
Elósegui Itxaso, El Concepto De Laicidad Abierta En El Informe Bouchard-Taylor Para Québec, 23
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO (2010).
27. Rey, supra note 24, at 403.
28. See RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS, Los Estados Frente a la Iglesia, 9 ANUARIO DE DERECHO
ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 17, 29–34 (1993). Ripensare la laicità might mean a proposal of an
academic legal debate for revisiting the real meaning and practical effect of laicism in our welfare
states and in our postmodern, pluralistic societies.
29. Giuseppe Dalla Torre, Laicità: Un Concetto Giuridicamente Inutile, 53 PERSONA Y

661

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:49 PM

2011

Turning to another very different perspective, represented in the
concept referred to as laicidad positiva, the matter is no clearer. The
concept of laicidad positiva was employed by Pope Benedict XVI, when
he asserted in a letter to Senator Marcello Pera (taking up, in part, the
terminology of Pius XII) that “a healthy laical State should also logically
leave room in its legislation for this fundamental dimension of the human
soul. This is, in fact, a ‘laicidad positiva,’ guaranteeing each citizen the
right to live his own religious faith with genuine freedom, including in
the public sphere.”30 This same notion of laicidad positiva was also
employed by the former Spanish congressman Victorino Mayoral in a
newspaper article31 and in the Manifiesto en Defensa de una Sociedad
Laica of the Fundación Cives (a Spanish secularist organization), which
asserted: “The laicidad positiva of the State, recognized in Article 16.3,
is presented in this context as the guarantee of freedom of conscience for
all, of the equality of all before the law, of non-discrimination for
religious reasons and of the neutrality of the State in relation to the
religious and moral beliefs of its citizens.”32 It is highly probable that
neither Benedict XVI nor Mayoral and the Fundación Cives meant
exactly the same thing when employing this term.
Following Dalla Torre, it is apparent that there are various ways of
approaching the concept of laicidad, some of which are even mutually
incompatible.33 In some cases, laicidad is equivalent to secularism, a
position that is not so much legal as it is ideological. Secularism is
conceived of as a confrontation between religion (a kind of fable, myth,
or superstition) and reason (as represented by empirical science and
technology with its unyielding advancements and benefits to humanity);
between dogma (whose formulations are indisputable and unchangeable)
and relativism; or even between traditionalism and innovation. Another
means of approaching laicidad is to view it as an equivalent of nonconfessionalism, in the sense that it refers to the state having no official
religion under its protection. Equally easy to assimilate into the concept
DERECHO 139 (2005).
30. Letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Senator Marcello Pera, Presidente Honorario de la
Fundación Magna Carta on the Norcia Conference “Libertad y Laicidad,” (Oct. 15, 2005), available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2005/documents/
hf_benxvi_let_20051015_senatore-pera_it.html.
31. Vitorino Mayoral, Religión o Política, EL PERIÓDICO (EXTREMADURA), Mar. 21, 2007,
available at http://www.elperiodicoextremadura.com/noticias/noticia.asp?pkid= 292556.
32. Manifiesto en defensa de una sociedad laica, FUNDACION CIVES,
http://www.fundacioncives.org/index.php?id=121 (last visited Aug. 27, 2011).
33. Dalla Torre, supra note 29, at 142–45.
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of laicidad is that of a state rejecting submission to laws foreign to it,
such as human rights, or spurning laws above it, such as natural law.
Under this formulation, a kind of ethical positivism gives rise to the
ethical state—more or less totalitarian, a producer of social values that
must be shared.
In light of so many possible definitions, it is reasonable to conclude
that “laicidad as such, as a valid universal concept, does not exist, and its
meaning and, therefore, its consequences will be different depending
even on the political party holding government power at any given
moment.”34
Considering the factors discussed above, would it not be an
appealing alternative to adopt the concept of religious neutrality? There
are reasons for responding to this question in both the affirmative and the
negative. Before answering either way, a few preliminary reflections are
needed.
III. NEUTRALITY AND LAW
As mentioned above, neutrality generally designates the quality or
attitude of one who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict. A
closer examination reveals two modes of expressing neutrality, under
which practically all others can be classified. The first of these relates to
the attitude or intellectual position of political authorities; a distinction is
made here between negative or indifferent neutrality and positive or
active neutrality. The second mode of expression relates, in a sense, to
equality of treatment: here, there is a distinction between neutrality of
purpose, which is impartiality with regard to specific factors or qualities
in decision making, and neutrality of outcome, which is guaranteeing that
neutral decision making does not produce unequal results because of
those factors or qualities.35
As noted earlier, in legal terms neutrality first emerged as a concept
in international law. Legal dictionaries and encyclopedias usually restrict
the concept of neutrality to the field of conflicts between states. Thus,

34. Isidoro Martín Sánchez & Gloria Moreno Botella, Laicidad y Enseñanza: Problemas
Actuales, in SECULARIZACIÓN Y LAICIDAD EN LA EXPERIENCIA DEMOCRÁTICA MODERNA:
JORNADAS DE ESTUDIO, OÑATI 239 (Juan Goti Ordeñana, San Sebastián, & Librería Carmelo eds.,
1996).
35. Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Para una Interpretación Laica de la Constitución, in ESTADO Y
RELIGIÓN, IN LA EUROPA DEL SIGLO XXI: ACTAS DE LAS XIII JORNADAS DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE
LETRADOS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 147, 167 (Centro de Estudios Políticos y
Constitucionales & Tribunal Constitucional eds., 2008).
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neutrality is “[t]he state of a nation which takes no part between two or
more other nations at war,”36 which implies at least some degree of
“abstention” and “impartiality,”37 referring mainly to a series of rules
governing relations between belligerent states and neutral states (those
not involved in the conflict). These rules belong to that particular sort of
international law that is traditionally called “law of war.” But it is
noteworthy that in times closer to the present the term “neutrality” has
been used in different and more blurred contexts, where it is less
connected, or at least diminished in its characteristic connection, with the
international law of war. In this sense we speak of “permanent
neutrality” of states, territories, or areas, although the concept is more
often designated by the term “neutralization.” In this sense, the condition
of neutrality does not arise merely as certain conflicts arise, but covers
any possible future conflict. In addition, permanent neutrality and the
legal status of its effects may be spoken of even in times of peace.38
In principle, neutrality refers to a position that a state voluntarily
decides to adopt in response to a conflict arising between other sovereign
entities that are its equals.39 In the neutrality of international law,
significant consequences can be identified for relations between the state
and religion. First of all, neutrality in international law implies the
existence of a conflict. But relations between religious groups in a
country do not necessarily need to be conflictive unless we intentionally
consider them as such.
[T]here is no confrontation or conflict here; there are only people
engaged in the task of their own realization as such. And on that task the
State is not called upon to make pronouncements, but to make it
possible . . . by removing obstacles, eliminating coercion and
guaranteeing its achievement within the scope of its powers.40
Nor is there any reason that relations between religions and the state
should be conflicting. In this respect, a position which holds that
religious movements—the “strong religions”41—are seeking to seize
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS (Henry C. Black et al. eds., 6th ed.
1991).
37. Alejandro Herrero Rubio, Neutralidad, in NUEVA ENCICLOPEDIA JURÍDICA 330
(Francisco Seix ed., 1982).
38. Luigi Sico, Neutralità, in 28 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 164, 164–65 (1978).
39. Manuel Ossorio et al., Neutralidad, in DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS POLÍTICAS
Y SOCIALES 644 (28th ed. 2001).
40. Ángel Marzoa, No Confesionalidad e Indeferentismo en Materia Religiosa (Dos
Términos no Implicados), 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 103, 106 (1989).
41. András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 30
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power cannot be said to be entirely neutral. In these cases, the state is not
a third neutral party but is merely another party to the conflict and must
defend itself.
Secondly, the concept of neutrality in this area appears to be broader
than what can be inferred from mere abstention. In principle, the
neutrality of a state in a military conflict between two other states means
that it will keep out of the conflict, neither providing assistance to nor
impeding the action of either side. More specifically, it is understood that
a primary duty of the neutral state consists of not providing the
adversaries with any material that could be used to pursue their
hostilities.42 However, total inaction—neutrality of impact43—is not the
only form of neutrality.44 A state could be equally neutral by doing all
possible to assist or impede both sides in the conflict to an equal
degree.45 At this point, the classical considerations related to the
principle of equality come into play with all their intensity. Does
neutrality require that trade relations with the parties to the conflict be
quantitatively equal? If one of the adversaries is a country with a
population of one million, while the other is a country of fifteen million,
would neutrality be understood to mean providing each country with one
ton of food, regardless of their differing demographics? A real example
of neutrality in war may serve to illustrate the point: can a consistently
neutral state, such as Switzerland, provide medicine to the injured and/or
sick of a country at war? If it does, should it provide the same aid to the
country on the other side of the conflict? If it fails to do so, does it
abandon its neutrality?46
Now let us turn to the legal relations of the state with religion. In this
context, it is virtually impossible to sustain “first generation”
neutrality—hands-off neutrality47 or negative neutrality48—and much
CARDOZO L. REV. 2401, 2402 (2009).
42. James Upcher, Neutrality, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 832 (Peter Cane &
Joanne
Conaghan
eds.,
2008),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/
views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t287.e1527 (subscription required).
43. Alexa Zellentin, Neutrality as a Twofold Concept, 4 LES ATELIERS DE L’ETHIQUE 159,
162–166 (2009), available at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/IMG/ pdf_13_Zellentin.pdf.
44. Peter Jones, The Ideal of the Neutral State, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 9, 18 (Robert E.
Goodin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989).
45. See Alan Montefiore, Preliminaries, in NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY: THE
UNIVERSITY AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT 5 (Alan Montefiore ed., 1975).
46. See RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 63
(1996).
47. Zellentin, supra note 43, at 160.
48. See Jones, supra note 44, at 18.
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less a neutrality of total indifference or distance, given the involvement
of and active role played by the interventionist state.49
“Negative” neutrality is far from being the only form in which the
phenomenon presents itself. A clear and unadulterated “take” on the
delimitation of the principle of neutrality would perhaps be just as
desirable as it is difficult to apply.50 This is because neutrality of inaction
has been overtaken by other forms of neutrality that are just as prevalent.
To illustrate the “advance” or reformulation of neutrality, reference is
often made to the role of the referee in a sports match or the judge in a
criminal proceeding.51 A neutral referee is not exactly a person who
remains completely out of the game; the referee fulfills a specific role
within it, the role of interpreting and applying the rules of the game. The
neutral referee applies the rules impartially, without applying greater
severity to one team over the other, helping or hindering both sides
equally. However, the rules that the referee makes use of have not been
created to prevent any kind of inequality, but only certain practices that
are deemed contrary to fair play. On this point, there is a certain parallel
with the activity of the state, which intervenes as a referee in the specific
legal terrain occupied by religious bodies in the different European
nations.52 Nevertheless, the neutral referee does not create the rules or
set the limits; he simply applies the rules created by others.
Apart from the figure of the referee, the image of the neutral judge in
a criminal proceeding has also been employed. This analogy is applied in
order to emphasize that the chances of the accused being convicted or

49. See THIEMANN, supra note 46, at 63–64.
50. “Neutrality (or non-confessionalism, or secularism, or whatever you wish to call it) is
either strictly applied or is not true neutrality, but favoring of one, another or several religious
options, always to the detriment of others, especially those at odds with the positive or widely
accepted religions. The alternative between neutrality and confusion is thus just as unbalanced as its
correlate between conflict and collaboration.” Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, La Neutralidad, por Activa y
por Pasiva, in LAICISMO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 161–62 (María Isabel de la Iglesia ed., 2009).
51. Jones, supra note 44, at 19–20; Marzoa, supra note 40, at 106.
52. For instance, Silvio Ferrari has remarked:
This common European model appears to be defined by the following coordinates: a) The
state is neutral (impartial) towards the various individual religious subjects. b) A religious
sub-sector is singled out within the public sector. This may be understood as a “playing
field” or “protected area.” Inside it the various collective religious subjects (churches,
denominations and religious communities) are free to act in conditions of substantial
advantage compared to those collective subjects that are not religious. c) The state has the
right to intervene in this area only to see that the players respect the rules of the game and
the boundaries of the playing field.
Silvio Ferrari, The New Wine and the Old Cask. Tolerance, Religion and the Law in
Contemporary Europe, 10 RATIO JURIS 75, 77–78 (1997) (citations omitted).
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absolved do not depend—must not depend—on factors such as race,
creed, sex, or ideology. Here, once again, neutrality is not a matter of
indifference. It requires the positive intervention of the judge to purge the
process of any prejudice, thereby “neutralizing” any influence in the
result that might otherwise be imposed by a range of external factors,
which are closely related to the suspect classes that we refer to in
constitutional law.
Both the referee of the match and the judge of the criminal
proceeding reveal once again that the neutrality of indifference, of total
abstention, is not viable because of the very features that frame the
dynamic of the religious factor in a social and democratic state of law. In
other words, alongside negative neutrality exists a positive neutrality that
requires a certain degree of involvement of the state in the hypothetical
social confrontation.
IV. NEUTRALITY AND IDEOLOGICAL LIBERALISM
The emergence of the principle of neutrality as a requirement of state
action was a product of ideological liberalism. Defining liberalism
proves to be an almost impossible task as this movement has developed
over a long period of time in the West and has many variants. Some of its
more consistent features are the defense of individualism and democracy,
the insistence on limitations on the power of the state, the social contract
theory, capitalism as an economic system, and freedom understood as
individual autonomy.53
From the outset, liberal philosophers themselves have been aware of
the controversial and difficult nature of the term neutrality: “[T]he term
neutrality is unfortunate; some of its connotations are highly misleading,
others suggest altogether impracticable principles.”54 Neutrality as a
liberal category is found in the work of the so-called neoliberals of the
twentieth century55 and, more specifically, of thinkers such as John
Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman.56
53. Nicola Matteucci, Liberalismo, in 2 DICCIONARIO DE POLÍTICA 875, 875–897 (Norberto
Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci, & Gianfranco Pasquino eds., 1991).
54. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 191 (2005).
55. MARIANO FAZIO, HISTORIA DE LAS IDEAS CONTEMPORÁNEAS: UNA LECTURA DEL
PROCESO DE SECULARIZACIÓN 183–188 (2006).
56. “[A] state or government . . . must be neutral between its citizens.” ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974). “No reason is a good reason if it requires the power
holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by his fellow citizens,
or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his
fellow citizens.” BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1981).
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Although there are certain observable differences in the thinking of these
authors,57 the common feature is the description of the liberal and neutral
state as one that does not impose a conception of good or of the good life
upon its citizens, but that allows them to follow their own conception of
good in their own way.58 The state, then, is neutral insofar as it does not
interfere in the individual conceptions of the good life, however lofty or
modest they may be. This attitude of noninterference is generally
described as Dworkin explains it: each person follows a more or less
complex conception of what gives life meaning. The academic researcher
who values the contemplative life has a conception of life meaning, just
as the citizen who watches a lot of television, drinks a lot of beer, and
says, “This is the life!” as he sits back in his armchair, even if he fails to
defend his thinking in the sophisticated manner of the academic
researcher.59 In any case, the state maintains its hands-off approach with
regard to the different methods of configuring the good life, including the
religious method. Dworkin goes so far as to argue that these are areas of
human life that are duly protected by the rights to freedom. What is
curious is that contemporary states—perhaps with the occasional
exception—are more inclined to subsidize and support research,
literature, or music than beer-drinking contests or world records for the
longest time spent in front of a television. This type of contemporary
state would not be neutral. Indeed, from this same perspective, the
Spanish state itself is not neutral, as its constitution recognizes culture,
research, the environment, and national heritage as constitutional values
(Spanish Constitution articles 44 to 46) but states authoritatively that it
does not grant this status to religion or beliefs.60
It would certainly be easy from any point of view—including a
liberal perspective—to confuse noninterference in individuals’
conceptions of ethics or the good life with ethical neutrality on the part
57. Jones, supra note 44, at 10.
58. Id. at 11.
59. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).
60. Dionisio Llamazares Fernández, Libertad de Conciencia y Laicidad en la Constitución
Española de 1978, in JORNADAS JURÍDICAS SOBRE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA 119–22 (Juan
Ferreiro Galguera ed., 2008). However, it is rather odd that article 16.3 of the Constitution should
include the sentence: “The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish
society . . .” wherein the direct complement is “the religious beliefs” and not “the freedom of
religion.” LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA Dec. 6, 1978, art. 16. And it is more surprising still to find
that when the Spanish Constitution mentions culture and research, it does so with a sentence in
which both constitutional values also appear in the same syntactic position of direct complement,
with just one tiny and significant difference: the state cannot “promote” religion as such
(confessionalism, multi-confessionalism, pluri-confessionalism) but merely “take [it] into account.”
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of the state. But it is undeniable that the state is not ethically neutral from
the moment that, for example, it establishes a criminal code. It is claimed
that the state declares and condemns criminal behavior, but that it
cannot—and must not—declare that there is behavior that is sinful.
Curiously, crimes and sins coincide in more than a few instances. It is
also claimed that the strength of the ethics of the state, admitting not only
the possibility but also the inevitable existence thereof,61 consists of the
fact that they lack any transcendent association and are held by free,
autonomous men, as opposed to the heteronomy and slavery of religious
morality.62 This is nothing less than reductionism because secular
morality can be followed with the same degree of closed-mindedness as
religious morality, while religious morality can be experienced with the
same sense of liberation as secular morality. The question, in my view, is
not one of patterns of behavior, but of the personality of specific
individuals.
The general categorization of liberal neutrality can, in turn, be
divided into four more specific notions63: rights neutrality,
epistemological neutrality, political neutrality, and legal neutrality.
Rights neutrality refers to the demarcation of those areas of human
experience and activity that fall outside the scope of the state. Such areas
are not subject to the processes of deliberation or debate, compromise or
negotiation that make up the political life of a liberal state.64 Meanwhile,
epistemological neutrality, which is closely related to rights neutrality,
refers to the acceptable arguments for demarcating the limitations of
admissible policy. Epistemological neutrality represents the idea that
liberal theory must be neutral not only in relation to the rights it
recognizes and protects, or with respect to the structures that it
recommends for political life, but also in relation to the intellectual
foundations that underlie those structures and rights. On the other hand,
political neutrality is concerned with institutional agreements and
arrangements. It means that the legislative procedures that establish
public policies must guarantee that political power is sufficiently spread
out, even, and shared so as to prevent any group from dominating the
61. Llamazares Fernández, supra note 60, at 134.
62. PIERPAOLO DONATI, LAICITÀ: LA RICERCA DELL’UNIVERSALE NELLE DIFFERENZE 11–
12 (2008).
63. ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 72–77 (1993). Other
distinctions related to neutrality include positive and negative neutrality (as discussed earlier), but
also neutrality of impact, neutrality as “equality of opportunity” and neutrality of justification, or
neutrality in the reasons justifying certain political choices. Zellentin, supra note 43, at 165–66.
64. Jones, supra note 44, at 18.
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political scene and imposing its moral view on society as a whole.
Finally, legal neutrality refers to judicial processes. In this case, liberal
political thought would argue that judges cannot reconsider what the
political process has already resolved. If legislators have promulgated a
particular law, it must be interpreted and applied neutrally, i.e.,
independently of the influence of any new evaluation of conflicting
points of view.
Nevertheless, liberal neutrality is not—nor can it be—a perspective
that defends the neutrality of, or the absence of values in, legislation in
relation to all moral values, whatever they may be. Rather, it must be
acknowledged that neutrality is itself a value, an ethical option, a
normative position, a perspective on what legislators and officials should
and should not do, a philosophical-political movement that sustains that
it is wrong for certain ideas to enter the political sphere,65 and that it is
right for them to be kept out. “[T]he propositions of authors such as
Rawls, Dworkin or Kymlicka respond, point for point, to the approach of
liberal ideologies which . . . are no less comprehensive than the
metaphysical or religious conceptions they exclude.”66 Liberal neutrality
does not achieve epistemological neutrality because it cannot subject its
own suppositions to that same rule of neutrality. In other words, it cannot
neutrally consider the so-called “primary goods” of health, physical
integrity, wealth, personal dignity, etc. The notion or conception of the
liberal good life presupposes an individualist narrative regarding the way
in which people generate or adopt lifestyles. The emphasis is placed on
an abstract individual who plans his own life and who chooses what is
best for him, overlooking at least two issues: first, that the individual
shapes his worldview and his lifestyle through contact with society,
which inevitably places spatial-temporal limitations on his abstract
liberty as true autonomy does not exist; and second, that the structure of
liberal neutrality itself generates inequality of results, as it makes certain
lifestyle choices more advantageous than others. Why? There are several
reasons, the most prominent of which are discussed below.
First of all, in the system of liberal neutrality individual options that
are consistent with liberal principles have better chances of thriving than
lifestyle options opposed to those principles. In other words, in the same
liberal social and state space, morally non-liberal options coexist (“I
65. See Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and Moral Neutrality, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 72
(Robert E. Goodwin & Andrew Reeve eds., 1989).
66. ALEJANDRO LLANO, EL CARÁCTER RELACIONAL DE LOS VALORES CÍVICOS 38 (2004)
(translation of quote).
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believe that there is only one good life and it would be best if everyone
lived that type of life”) with morally liberal options (“I believe that there
is no good life that is valid for everyone, and it is best for everyone to
live the kind of life they consider good”). The second of these options
has an advantage over the first in the sense that—by pure coincidence—
it happens to be the official view of the state. Consider this comparison:
it is well known that a confessional state may recognize religious
freedom on a level playing field, but it is also true that significant state
confessionalism generates inequalities that may go as far as being
discriminatory. Similarly, a neutral state generates a supposition that
favors certain ways of life—those that are liberal. Liberal neutrality is
more inclined to favor secular or laical world views over religious
ones.67
Secondly, it is worth reflecting on some of the implications of
neutrality from an economic perspective of the “market of ideas and
beliefs.”68 If a large number of individuals or citizens end up at least
nominally coinciding in the type of good life they choose, it is more than
likely that certain disruptions will occur. The effect of an economy of
scale could make this popular choice “cheaper” or more accessible, and
this easier access might make it more appealing to the masses.
Conversely, a less popular form of good life would prove less accessible,
more “expensive” to pursue. On the other hand, the “suppliers” of more
popular good life options may “raise” the cost of achieving the goal of
consumer satisfaction. As a result, in either case, the pursuit of certain
good life options would be more difficult than the pursuit of others. And
then there is the question of whether certain good life options produce a
greater level of satisfaction than others in the citizen or individual, which
require a greater “investment” to achieve the same degree of satisfaction.
By way of example: the good life of the contemplative monk is cheaper
in economic terms than the good life of the collector of the works of
Diego Velázquez. This may even be true not only for the question of
choice in general, but to the actual specific enjoyment of fundamental
rights. Thus, for example, freedom of education may be satisfied more
cheaply in the case of parents who choose state-run schools than those
who choose alternative private schools. However, curiously, for the
Spanish Constitutional Court there is no appreciable difference: freedom
of education consists basically in the freedom of choice, regardless of

67. See Madeley, supra note 18, at 8.
68. See Jones, supra note 44, at 14–18.
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what the financial cost of that choice might be.69 If in response to this
inequality of costs, satisfactions, or results the state were to intervene to
ensure the equal promotion of the different conceptions of good by
means of positive action, would it be abandoning its position of
neutrality? For some liberals the answer is yes, because the spheres of
freedom—immunity from coercion—mark the limits of action for a
neutral state. This is known as neutrality of purpose. But for others, such
intervention is not only possible but also forms part of the notion of
neutrality itself in order to ensure that all conceptions of good are equal.
This is known as neutrality of outcome. In any case, returning to the
previous example, it would seem undeniable that if the state finances
private schools, the lack of neutrality would consist of financing only
secular private schools and not religious schools.70
Thirdly, liberal neutrality does not guarantee equal treatment of
citizens. It does so only when those covered by the principle have
accepted liberal standards of the good life. But in such cases, neutrality is
only apparent. In this regard, it is worth recalling that many of the most
significant religious persecutions of the last two centuries were carried
out under the pretext of laws that were formally general and neutral.71
Liberalism has almost imperceptibly introduced the illusion of
neutral judgment and decisions, i.e., political solutions that are the
product of a rational process unhindered by any particular world view.
According to liberalism, we can and must separate religious judgments
and conclusions from secular ones. And, therefore, secular world views
are elevated to the level of political and legal regulation simply because
it is believed that they are of a different nature. Nevertheless,
69. Constitutional Court Decision 5/1981, February 13: “Also arising from the principle of
freedom of education is the right of parents to choose whatever religious and moral instruction that
they may desire for their children (art. 27.3).” (Court Consideration no. 7). “The ideological
neutrality of teaching in public education institutions regulated under the L.O.E.C.E. imposes an
obligation upon teachers employed in those institutions to refrain from any form of ideological
indoctrination, which is the only attitude compatible with the respect for the freedom of the families
who, by free decision or forced by circumstances, have not chosen education institutions with a
specific, explicit ideological orientation.” (Court Consideration no. 9) (emphasis added).
70. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993).
71. W. Cole Durham, Perspectives On Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 33 (J.D. van der
Vyer & John Witte eds., 1996). This may well be the case of article 26 of the 1931 Spanish
Republican Constitution (“Quedan disueltas aquellas Ordenes religiosas que estatutariamente
impongan, además de los tres votos canónicos, otro especial de obediencia a autoridad distinta de la
legítima del Estado”) or even the case of the regulation contested in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah. See 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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[n]either the need to make religious decisions, nor the extreme
difficulty in doing so, can be avoided. And these decisions, in one
fashion or another, will have to be enforced, making perfectly clear that
what we are dealing with is not apples and oranges (secular judgments
and religious judgments) but apples and apples (secular judgments that
are at the same time religious).72

It is not for nothing that when, for example, the principle of neutrality is
established in German law, it is understood that generic and abstract
neutrality does not prevent or prohibit the possible coincidence of
specific moral values in the German body of law with those sustained by
religious groups.73 This has ultimately led to the postulation of an
overlapping consensus,74 which may benefit epistemologically75 from
contributions by citizens with religious beliefs.76
V. NEUTRALITY AS A PRINCIPLE AND STATE-RELIGION RELATIONS
Based on the reflections above, it would be reasonable to conclude
that there is simply no such thing as a neutral state. Neutrality cannot be
the essence of the state, but rather a requirement for its action in certain
especially sensitive spheres of societal life. In general, it could be said
that in relation to religious beliefs
[t]he neutrality of the secular State applies rules of political justice to
religion or the religions practiced by the citizens of a given society.
These rules are based on criteria of freedom, equality and procedural
fairness. From this political perspective, religion is accepted as part of
the reality and the cultural heritage of a society or nation and so,
logically, religious praxis and its facilitation come to form part of the

72. Douglas Farrow, Three Meanings of Secular, FIRST THINGS, May 2003, at 22.
73. GERHARD ROBBERS, RELIGION AND LAW IN GERMANY 87 (2010).
74. “[A] consensus in which it is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral
doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the
criterion of justice is that political conception itself.” John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1987).
75. “The ultimate solution, however, lies in another direction. What is needed is not a
requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that
liberalism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers.
Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not
abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice
but because the speaker has the right to speak.” CARTER, supra note 70, at 230.
76. MARTIN RHONHEIMER, CRISTIANISMO Y LAICIDAD: HISTORIA Y ACTUALIDAD DE UNA
RELACIÓN COMPLEJA 187 (2009).
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common good.77

The remainder of this section briefly examines the application of
neutrality in legal relations between the state and religion in certain legal
frameworks in the West.
In the United States, the principle of neutrality as a guideline in statereligion relations was formulated prior to or simultaneous with the
generation of the principle in liberal political theory.78 Perhaps the first
application of the idea of religious neutrality was the case law on intrachurch disputes regarding the assets of a church or the cases involving
disputes between factions in a religious community. In these cases, rather
than resolving the conflict based on church doctrine (which would
require the state somehow to become an “arbitrator of theological
interpretation”), the principles of the law of the state are asserted—the
norms of common law—as “neutral” elements for the resolution of the
conflict.79
The definition of religious neutrality in U.S. law was formally
established by Phillip B. Kurland in 1961.80 According to Kurland, the
religious clauses of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights81 should
be interpreted on the basis of a single precept: the state cannot use
religion as a criterion for action or omission because these clauses, read
as a whole, forbid both the classification of individuals on the basis of
their religion and the concession of benefices or offices.82 This formal
neutrality is appealing for its simplicity and impartiality and is totally
plausible until, as Douglas Laycock points out, we stop to ponder its
consequences—some of which produce disconcerting results that are
firmly counterintuitive.83 Thus, for example, from the “neutral”
77. Id. at 134.
78. A general account of the neutrality principle in state-religion relations may be found in
W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §§ 2:6, 2:17, 2:93
(2011).
79. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY 500–17 (1996); JOSE IGNACIO RUBIO LOPEZ, LA PRIMERA DE LAS LIBERTADES: LA
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DURANTE LA CORTE REHNQUIST (1986-2005), at
166–68 (2006); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
80. See Phillip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 96 (1961).
81. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82. See Kurland, supra note 80.
83. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1000 (1990).
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application of the National Prohibition Act of 1919 (also known as the
Volstead Act or the “dry law”)84 would follow the impossibility of
celebrating a sacrament of the Catholic Church, of certain Protestant
ceremonies, and of the Jewish Seder. And there are other situations
where a law fully justified from a secular perspective—and coinciding
only accidentally with a precept of a specific religion—leads to the
prohibition of the exercise of some practice of a religious nature.85
Based on this potential for unwanted results, Laycock himself
proposes a different form of neutrality, which he calls substantive
neutrality, according to which the constitutional mandate requires the
state to act in a way that neither promotes nor dissuades religious or
nonreligious belief, practice, or observance.86 When neutrality is defined
this way, some degree of consideration can be given to situations where
an apparently neutral piece of legislation may harm or benefit a
particular religion or belief.
From the distinction between formal and substantial neutrality a
conclusion may be drawn (recently addressed by a Spanish scholar87)
which presents a paradox: not every violation of strict neutrality is an
assault on religious freedom; but, at the same time, not every violation of
religious freedom is simultaneously an assault on neutrality. But if we
focus on the actual practice of neutrality, Laycock notes a third
classification, which he calls disaggregated neutrality, where the
importance of a particular factor at play takes on a preponderant value in
decisions that are far from neutral.88 As an example, Laycock refers to
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton.89 This ruling
invalidates a federal school support program for children with few
economic resources in religious schools. In itself, the program is neutral,
as it provides assistance to disadvantaged children (neutrality of
84. See 41 Stat. 305–23 (1919).
85. Waldron, supra note 65, at 40. Similarly, the acknowledgment of Sunday as a day of rest
conforms to neutral criteria. S.T.C. Feb. 13, 1985, No. 19 (Spain) (Court Consideration 4).
86. Laycock, supra note 83, at 1001.
87. Zoila Combalía Solís, Relación entre laicidad del Estado y libertad religiosa en la
jurisprudencia reciente del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 24 REVISTA GENERAL DE
DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 1 (2010).
88. For instance, Laycock writes:
I call this disaggregated neutrality, because it looks only at one side of the balance of
advancing or inhibiting. Because absolute zero is not achievable, it is always possible to
find some effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Thus, if you look only at one side of
the balance, you can always find a constitutional violation.
Laycock, supra note 83, at 1007.
89. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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outcome) regardless of their beliefs (neutrality of purpose). However, the
Supreme Court viewed the program as contrary to the neutrality of the
state (formal neutrality prevailing in the case) as it implied a penetrating
and permanent state presence in the religious school receiving the
assistance.90
Incidentally, this argument of “disaggregated neutrality” might also
be identified in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, where neutral treatment of the dress of
university students gave way to a partial view of the problem based on
the demands arising from the principle of secularism in the Turkish legal
and social context.91 Thus we have disaggregated neutrality to the extent
that one of the factors at play, either the promotion of a belief or the
dissuasion or undermining of a belief, assumes decisive force. These are
cases where, given that any action or omission of the state necessarily
has short- or long-term consequences, it appears impossible to achieve
absolute zero. If the state acts, it is providing support and therefore not
neutral; but if it does not act, its silence is not neutral either because it is
interpreted as hostility toward religion.
We can find this same perception of disaggregated neutrality in the
case Lautsi v. Italy.92 As Joseph Weiler pointed out in his speech before
the court on the appeal against the decision of the lower chamber, if the
crucifix remains, the immediate message sent will be one of state support
90. The Court stated:
The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon and Meek are thus present
in this case. First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian
environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing
inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message. In short, the scope
and duration of New York City’s Title I program would require a permanent and
pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.
Id. at 412–13 (citations omitted).
91. In Sahin, the European Court of Human Rights remarked:
Having regard to the above background, it is the principle of secularism, as elucidated by
the Constitutional Court . . . which is the paramount consideration underlying the ban on
the wearing of religious symbols in universities. In such a context, where the values of
pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of
men and women are being taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the
relevant authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned
and so consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including, as in the
present case, the Islamic headscarf, to be worn.
Sahin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 44774/98 (2005).
92. Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06 (2009). The case was appealed and decided by
the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 30814/06. According to this latter
decision displaying crucifixes in Italian public schools classrooms is not contrary to the European
Convention of Human Rights.
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for a religion, of not being neutral, but ultimately, “[e]ven more alarming
would be the situation if the crucifixes, always there, suddenly were
removed.”93 “Make no mistake,” adds the U.S. constitutionalist, “a Statemandated naked wall, as in France, may suggest to pupils that the State is
taking an anti-religious attitude. . . . Likewise, a crucifix on the wall may
be perceived as coercive. Again, it depends on the curriculum to
contextualize and teach the children in the Italian class tolerance and
pluralism.”94
It is, therefore, no surprise that, with a healthy dose of skepticism,
the concept of neutrality in U.S. law may be classified as a “protean
concept,” capable of changing form or content.95 Thus we may speak of
strict neutrality (neutrality of indifference), which is especially reflected
in the prohibition of state aid to religion, or of nondiscriminatory
neutrality (close to substantial neutrality), which hints at a degree of
permeability of the public sphere in relation to religious beliefs, provided
that the symbols and practices symbolically supported by the state are
not sectarian or discriminatory. But there is also an argument for the
possibility of benevolent neutrality.96 This concept aims to broaden the
framework within which religion might be relevant to include the
adaptation of the public sphere to religious beliefs.97 This position

93. Joseph Weiler, Oral Intervention by Professor Weiler on Behalf of Armenia, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, and San Marino—States Who Intervene as Third Parties
in the Lautsi Case Before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights,
ILSUSSIDIARIO.NET
(June
30,
2010),
http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/PoliticsSociety/2010/7/1/EXCLUSIVE-Joseph-Weiler-How-I-defended-the-Crucifix-Before-the-EuropeanCourt-of-Human-Rights/96909/.
94. Id.
95. THIEMANN, supra note 46, at 60.
96. The term is based on the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, where it has been
employed in decisions related to the application of the clause prohibiting the establishment of an
official religion. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court, commenting
on tax exemptions for places of worship said:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by
the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.
Id. at 669; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–44 (1994) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at
669); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 669). On benevolent neutrality, strict separation and
the legal restriction, see W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
LAW § 2:6 (2011).
97. See DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 96, § 2:6.
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interprets strict neutrality and the “no aid to religion” policy as hostility
toward religious beliefs, a policy contrary to the cultural history of the
United States.98 Benevolent neutrality proscribes only official
confessionalism or state interference in religion.99 According to this
position, neutrality means impartiality of the state with regard to all
religions, but not a distancing from religion.100
It is worth noting here that the term benevolent neutrality is also
employed in German law as a concept associated with cooperation.101
The structure of the German system of relations between the state and
religion cites neutrality as one of its most important features.102
Neutrality fulfills some specific roles in the system: guaranteeing
religious peace, ensuring the free practice of the beliefs of the citizens
and of religions, and making it possible for each citizen to identify with
the state as a home for all.103 Neutrality means that the German state
cannot identify with any church and prohibits the state from any special
inclination toward a particular religious community by applauding the
intrinsic value of its ideas or qualities.104 Ideological organizations are
placed on an equal footing with religious institutions. But at the same
time, religious organizations cannot be placed by the state in a
disadvantageous position in relation to other social groups: an
antireligious policy or state atheism would be contrary to the neutrality
that characterizes the system. Moreover, neutrality means
nonintervention, and is intimately associated with the principle of
autonomy of religious organizations. Finally, it is important to note that
neutrality in German law also means positive neutrality: the state is
required to actively promote religion by ensuring the moral “space” that
religion needs to develop.105 This positive neutrality makes possible—
and at the same time requires—the inclusion of religious needs in urban

98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. María Roca, Consideraciones Acerca de la Eventual Personificación Jurídica de la
Comisión Asesora de Libertad Religiosa, in COMISIÓN ASESORA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA:
REALIDAD Y FUTURO 154 (2010).
102. ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 86–87.
103. This is according to German federal constitutional case law. See Maria Roca, La
Neutralidad del Estado: Fundamento Doctrinal y Actual Delimitación en la Jurisprudencia, 48
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 251, 253–54 (1996).
104. ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 86.
105. Id. at 87.
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development law, for example.106
Turning our attention back from German law to North America, this
time to Canada, it bears noting that
[i]nsofar as the requirement of State neutrality is concerned, it is
necessary because intervention by the State in favor of a given religion
places an incompatible pressure on the freedom of those who profess a
less favored religion. Therefore, it is understandable that, in a way, the
obligation of neutrality arises from the right to free exercise [of
religion].107

Furthermore, in cases where there is no explicit establishment of
neutrality as an objective or structural108 principle—as in the Canadian
case—the full recognition of freedom of religion requires an attitude of
the state that, nevertheless, “is not as strict as one founded on an
autonomous principle of neutrality.”109 In other words, the adaptation or
accommodation of the religious needs of citizens is more flexible when
neutrality is a consequence of religious freedom rather than in cases
where neutrality is established primarily as an objective or structural
principle. In a way, this assertion is corroborated in the French and
Turkish
cases
(although
not
only
in
these cases), as it is shown in a somewhat inadequate regional European
jurisprudence.110
Nor has Italian church-state law remained immune from the
provocative developments regarding state neutrality in relation to the
religious phenomenon. Indeed, the concept of neutrality appears as a
requirement imposed on the political sphere because of the principle of
the secular state; thus, the political sphere must be neutral in the face of
possible conflicts between religious values and in the performance of
certain activities (i.e., the broadcasting system or public education

106. Id. at 82.
107. José Woehrling, La Libertad de Religión, el Derecho al Acomodamiento Razonable y la
Obligación de Neutralidad Religiosa del Estado en el Derecho Canadiense, 33 REVISTA CATALANA
DE DRET PÚBLIC 1, 3 (2006).
108. José María Rodriguez de Santiago, El Estado Aconfesional o Neutro Como Sujeto. un
modelo Explicativo del Artículo 16.3 CE, in ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN EN LA EUROPA DEL SIGLO XXI:
ACTAS DE LAS XIII JORNADAS DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE LETRADOS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
123 (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales & Tribunal Constitucional eds., 2008).
109. Woehrling, supra note 107, at 6.
110. Javier Martínez-Torrón, La Cuestión del Velo Islámico en la Jurisprudencia de
Estrasburgo, 4 DERECHO Y RELIGIÓN 87 (2009).
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system).111 The neutrality and, associated with it, the impartiality of the
state toward the religious factor, religious institutions, and symbols,
would be the “test” —the patent manifestation—of the secularism that
characterizes its legal system.112 There is also recognition of the link
existing between the way of interpreting the principle of secularism and
the ideologically liberal culture, according to which the distinction
between politics and religion results in two lines of behavior: the
neutrality of the state toward the various positive expressions of religious
values, and the application of the principle of equality of treatment and
nondiscrimination.113 In turn, neutrality is explained or specified in two
directions: on the one hand, indifference as a reflection of the basic
principle of the lack of jurisdiction of the contemporary state in religious
affairs, which prevents it from expressing judgments in religious matters;
and on the other, nonidentification, based on the idea that the institutions
through which the state acts must have a character of “generality,” so
that all citizens—regardless of their beliefs—are able to “recognize
themselves” in state institutions.114 At the same time, it is argued that
current circumstances promote an understanding of secularism that is
more associated with nonidentification than indifference.115
Where does Spanish academic opinion situate the notion of neutrality
within the dynamic framework of the so-called “guiding principles” of
church-state law? As a sample, and with no intention of being
exhaustive, the following will refer to a few contributions that may prove
significant.
For one sector of expert opinion, neutrality in religious affairs
constitutes a terminological quest to replace terms such as secularism or
non-confessionalism, which allows a more dynamic connectivity
between the attitude of the state in relation to the religious factor and
nonreligious world views.116 The result is the adoption of a concept of
religious and ideological neutrality.117
111. ENRICO VITALI & ANTONIO G. CHIZZONITI, DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO: MANUALE BREVE:
TUTTO IL PROGRAMMA DE’ESAME CON DOMANDE E RISPOSTE COMMENTATE 60 (2009).
112. MARIA CRISTINA FOLLIERO, DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO: ELEMENTI: PRINCIPI NON SCRITTI,
PRINCIPI SCRITTI, REGOLE 159 (2007).
113. VITALI & CHIZZONITI, supra note 111.
114. FOLLIERO, supra note 112.
115. VITALI & CHIZZONITI, supra note 111.
116. JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, RELIGIÓN, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD: ANTIGUOS Y NUEVOS
PLANTEAMIENTOS EN EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 178 (1999).
117. Id. at 178–79.
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At the same time, neutrality establishes an operative bridge between
non-confessionalism and nondiscrimination: “The neutrality of the State,
from a functional perspective, has significant consequences for the
understanding of the principle of equality. In its negative sense, equality
is equivalent to non-discrimination and, although conceptually diverse, it
is in a certain sense subsumed in the concept of neutrality.”118
Other sectors of opinion posit the existence of an implicit obligation
of ideological neutrality,119 with two dimensions: impartiality of public
authorities (giving the same treatment to all ideas and beliefs) and state
abstention from participation in any debate on politics, philosophy,
morality, aesthetics, etc.120 Neutrality prohibits indoctrination in any
aspect of society on the part of the state.121 And this extends to various
aspects of administrative action, from public intervention of the police to
the provision of services or the granting of subsidies.122

For another sector, neutrality is a specific mandate derived from
secularism for the purposes of avoiding discrimination.123 Public
institutions should be neutral, as should public officials in the
performance of public duties; it is not for nothing, for example, that the
Spanish Constitution of 1978 sets forth in its article 103.3 the regulation
by law of “the guarantees regarding impartiality in the discharge of their
duties.”124 As a result, religious considerations would not form part of
the decisive factors that representatives of the state can employ. A
variant of this same view interprets neutrality as a “component” of
secularism in evolution, which unites separation and neutrality as
necessary consequences.125 Again, neutrality requires “the State, the
public institutions and the holders of public office, regardless of their
118. Id. at 184.
119. This obligation parallels the principle of non-confessionalism in relation to the religious
factor.
120. LUIS MARÍA DÍEZ-PICAZO, SISTEMA DE DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 247 (2d ed. 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Isidoro Martín Sánchez, El Modelo Actual de Relación Entre el Estado y el Factor
Religioso en España, in JORNADAS JURÍDICAS SOBRE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA 53, 89 (Juan
Ferreiro Galguera ed., 2008).
124. C.E., B.O.E. n. 103, Dec. 6, 1978 (Spain).
125. Llamazares Fernández, supra note 60, at 117, 129.

681

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:49 PM

2011

own beliefs and convictions, to carry out their duties without any hint of
discrimination, either positive or negative, toward the citizens as a
consequence of their beliefs or convictions.”126 In short, neutrality is a
fundamental element, the functional dimension of secularism, a criterion
for action of the public authorities, supported by separation as an
instrumental guarantee.127
Recalling the connections of the term with international law, another
sector of Spanish academic opinion associates neutrality, on the one
hand, with equality, whereby the state must intervene actively in order to
ensure the exercise of religious freedom.128 Religious assistance in
prisons or in the army must be provided to all, regardless of creed or
conviction; if the state acts on this basis, it acts neutrally.129 But on the
other hand, neutrality is a specific ideological characteristic of public
educational institutions (as explained by the Spanish Constitutional
Court130), although this is not so much a consequence of the ideological
neutrality of the state as such but rather a requirement derived from the
lack of freedom in education.131 This last point would really require
further exploration, given its importance. For the moment, this Article
will contend that neutrality and education are incompatible concepts.
Education means the transmission of values; wherever values are
transmitted, neutrality is absent. When a constitutional court applies the
term “neutrality” to education,132 it does so with the intention of
126. Id. at 117, 132.
127. Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, La Laicidad en la Constitución Española, 53 PERSONA Y
DERECHO 157, 163 (2005).
128. JOSÉ MARÍA GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE, DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL 124–25 (4th ed.
1997).
129. Id. at 125.
130. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has explained,
[i]n a political legal system based on pluralism, ideological and religious freedom of
individuals and non-confessionalism of the State, all public institutions and very
especially educational institutions must be, in effect, ideologically neutral. This
neutrality, which does not prevent the organization in public schools of optional classes
to facilitate the right of parents to choose for their children a religious and moral
education in accordance with their own convictions (art. 27.3 of the Constitution), is a
necessary feature of each of the teaching positions offered at the school, and not the
hypothetical result of casual coincidence in the institution and in relation to the students
of teachers of different ideological orientations whose teachings mutually neutralize one
another.
S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1981 (No. 5) (Spain), http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/
doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1981-0005.
131. GONZÁLEZ DEL VALLE, supra note 128, at 399–402.
132. For more on the positive (optional classes to facilitate the right of parents to an education
in accordance with their own beliefs) and negative aspects (prohibition of indoctrination), see
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specifying with a “positive” term what is “negatively” expressed with the
concept of “indoctrination.” That is, the aim is to not indoctrinate.133
In any case, there are also sectors of constitutional academic opinion
that, considering a global analysis of the question—not focusing on a
specific country, but covering in their reflections a wide range of
European countries—view the terms neutrality, secularism, and laïcité as
more or less equivalent expressions, also compatible in some cases with
cooperation.134 At the same level of analysis, other sectors posit the
establishment of secularist constitutionalism (laicïté), enforcing
secularism as an objective or structural principle, as opposed to
incomplete “conceptual representations” or metaphors such as
“separation,” “convention or adaptation,” and, of course, “neutrality,”135
which is criticized in terms of its actual operability. Indeed, for neutrality
to conserve its appeal as “strict impartiality” on the part of the state, the
state must determine the limits of public space and, once these are
determined, religious activities falling outside this neutral sphere must be
protected. The problem is the anachronistic nature of this operation, as
the welfare state expands enormously the area of public space, making it
extremely complex—or even unviable—to require strict neutrality in
activities in which, both historically and today, religious groups act not
as supporters of state welfare initiatives, but as agents of what they view
as part of their specific mission. In this sense, it is illustrative to recall
here the problems associated with implementation by the state of
nondiscrimination in the provision of services (particularly at present in
the United Kingdom),136 which ends up reducing the social presence of
some religions in charity activities to a minimum. It seems, then, that the
constitutional balance between religious autonomy and other values of
ideologically liberal constitutionalism cannot be achieved simply by
appealing to the neutrality of the state. “A neutrality mantle is ill-suited
PRIETO ALVAREZ, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y ESPACIOS P L
: LAICIDAD, PLURALISMO,
, 190–91 (2010).
133. Ana Llano Torres, Unas Reflexiones Sobre la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo en
Relación con “Educación para la Ciudadanía,” en diálogo con Adela Cortina, 11 ANUARIO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 253, 258 (2010); Ana Llano Torres, El cansancio de Occidente, el nihilismo y
el debate constitucional sobre el derecho a la educación: ¿de qué se trata?, ¿qué hace posible hoy
una auténtica experiencia educativa?, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 435, 489 (2004).
134. RENÁTA UITZ, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 16–18 (2007).
135. Sajó, supra note 41, at 2403–14.
136. See Neil Addison, Catholic Care an Attack on the Idea of Charity Itself, RELIGION LAW
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2010, 3:18 PM), http://religionlaw.blogspot.com/2010/08/catholic-care-no-freedomfor-charities.html.
T
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to the task of balancing the relevant interests because both sides can—
and do—seize the mantle with equal force.”137
It is more than likely that the sector of opinion referred to in the
previous paragraph is advocating a strict, first-generation neutrality, a
neutrality that jealously defends the state against the different versions of
the good life of social actors, both religious and nonreligious.
Nevertheless, this neutrality, over time, has ceased to be the unequivocal
posture of the state.138 We are now clearly in another phase, which
belongs, once again, to the “market of ideas and beliefs,” and which was
analyzed by Joseph Weiler in his statement before the European Court of
Human Rights. Weiler notes:
If the social pallet of society were only composed of blue yellow and
red groups, then black—the absence of color—would be a neutral
color. But once one of the social forces in society has appropriated
black as its color, then that choice is no longer neutral. Secularism does
not favor a wall deprived of all State symbols. It is religious symbols
which are anathema.139

VI. NEUTRALITY AS A PRINCIPLE IN SPANISH LAW
In view of the foregoing facts and reflections, it would be logical
now to summarize the important points, identify the more outstanding
critical elements, and propose some ideas about the possible role that the
term “neutrality” may play in church-state law.
As noted above, neutrality was originally used to refer to the activity
or omission through which an individual refrains from intervening in or
influencing a conflict between two or more other individuals.140 From
the outset, this view does not fit easily with any situation involving
religious activity in a society. Only in those cases where there is a
religious conflict between two factions in the same country or the same
society, as might have been the case in Germany, has the state—for
historical reasons—kept its distance and declared itself neutral toward
the conflicts between Christian churches. Of course, this was not the case
in Spain, or in Italy, where the historical conflicts have been different,
involving no more than the state and the Catholic Church (e.g., the
137. Toni M. Massaro, Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality”: A NonNeutral Critique, 84 OR. L. REV. 935, 944 (2005).
138. ANDRÉS OLLERO, ESPAÑA ¿UN ESTADO LAICO?: LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN
PERSPECTIVA CONSTITUCIONAL 41–47 (2005).
139. Weiler, supra note 93.
140. See supra Parts II and III.
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Italian State unification process, Spanish regalism, and the right of the
Ecclesiastical Royal Patronage or Patronato regio, the anti-Catholic
policy of the Second Spanish Republic, etc.).
Neutrality in Spanish law is indifference or absence of judgment
(either approval or reproach) only with regard to the dogmatic content of
religious groups. But this type of neutrality is not precisely negative with
regard to religion as a social phenomenon; it is more akin to indifference
or nonrelation. In Spain, part of the multidimensional mandate of Article
16 of the Constitution establishes that the public authorities must take
into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society, within the scope of
a fundamental right (although that fundamental right may not necessarily
entail abstract consideration of religious beliefs in themselves141). It
therefore might be appropriate to speak of positive neutrality as an
expression of this principle or attitude in its application to the religious
sphere. In this case, it is not indifference toward religions but the
establishment of a certain type of relation and of political dialogue by
virtue of a fundamental right. Neutrality thus understood justifies and
supports the necessary adaptations of the law of the apparently neutral
state in order to prevent unexpected infringements upon the free exercise
of beliefs.
The use of the qualifying terms “principle” or “attitude” with
reference to state neutrality is intentional. In light of the foregoing
reflections, it might be suggested that we are perhaps witnessing an
emerging principle invoked to overcome, in part, the problems associated
with the principle of laicidad discussed at the beginning of this paper.
The response to this suggestion is not simple. On the one hand, neutrality
as a principle is not entirely immune from the same confusion provoked
by the principle of laicidad. Indeed, the preceding pages list multiple
definitions for neutrality.142 On the other hand, if the focus of attention
on academic opinion and case law is turned on beliefs in general,
laicidad could turn into a refuge and an excuse that implicitly authorizes
the State to remain neutral toward religions but with a certain myopia
that prevents the detection, prevention, and condemnation of the
assumption of power by nonreligious world views, a risk which is quite
real and may already be happening.
Along with negative and positive neutrality, this Article has also
made reference above to neutrality of purpose (impartiality) and

141. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 116, at 190.
142. See supra Part V.
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neutrality of outcome.143 These two dimensions or definitions of
neutrality direct our attention to the facet of equality intrinsic to the idea
of neutrality. Are both definitions applicable to religious neutrality? Of
course, it is clear that neutrality of purpose lies at the heart of neutrality
in its closest dimension to laicidad. And with regard to neutrality of
outcome, as applied to the religious factor, it is necessary to make a
distinction. Neutrality of outcome does apply in this context provided
that its objective is the establishment of the conditions to ensure real
enjoyment of religious freedom, removing the structural barriers of the
apparently neutral legal system. Neutrality of outcome, however, would
not be applicable to those actions that have the purpose of altering in any
way the internal structure of religions, communities, or churches in a
given society through measures of compensation that would directly
affect demography, social profile, or societal acceptance, or that would
constitute direct or indirect incentives of persuasion or dissuasion with
regard to given beliefs.
In this day and age, it would be difficult to argue that neutrality
might come to constitute a guiding principle of Spanish church-law
law—a kind of synthesis of the principles of equality and laicidad.
Nevertheless, neutrality could ultimately prevail when considering the
terminological evolution of the Spanish Constitutional Court. In effect,
the court began by applying the category of non-confessionalism
(aconfesionalidad) before moving to the use of laicidad and
subsequently to laicidad positiva.144 Although neutrality appeared as a
concept during these periods, it was still in incipient form, restricted to
neutrality in public schools.145 However, in 1996 the Constitutional
Court began to employ the specific term “religious neutrality,”146

143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
144. GUSTAVO SUÁREZ PERTIERRA, LAICIDAD Y COOPERACIÓN COMO BASES DEL MODELO
ESPAÑOL: UN INTENTO DE INTERPRETACIÓN INTEGRAL (Y UNA NUEVA PLATAFORMA DE CONSENSO)
26–28 (2010).
145. See ROBBERS, supra note 73, at 117–19.
146. The Court has explained this concept as follows:
[A]rt. 16.3 CE, in stipulating that “no denomination shall have official status”, establishes
a principle of neutrality of the public authorities in terms which, as stated in the S.T.C.
24/1982 and 340/1993, “prohibits any kind of confusion between religious and State
functions.” A direct consequence of this constitutional mandate is that citizens, in the
exercise of their right to religious freedom, have as right “to act in this sphere with full
immunity from action by the State” (S.T.C. 24/1982, Legal Grounds 1), the neutrality of
which in religious affairs thus becomes a premise for peaceful coexistence between the
different religious convictions existing in a plural and democratic society (art. 1.1 CE).
S.T.C.,
Nov.
11,
1996
(No.
177)
(Spain)
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/
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replacing the concept of laicidad, which nevertheless continues to
coexist with it.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article began this study with reference to the term neutrality in
three senses: myth, principle, and meaning. In reviewing the above
reflections in light of the title of this work, in one sense, neutrality is a
myth, because it proves impossible on various levels (a truly neutral state
does not exist), or because it is significantly nuanced in order to adapt its
appealing objective to the complexities of reality. Indeed, it is important
that models constructed as castles in the air, grandiloquent and
convincing in abstraction, do not jar with reality to the point that they
produce results contrary to justice. Neutrality is at the same time a
principle insofar as it expresses not only a guideline or a constant related
to the legislation that regulates the fundamental freedoms (including
religious freedom), but also because it expresses a directive and mandate
consistent with the requirements of state action in managing legal
contexts in which the religious factor is present. Finally, neutrality also
points to a complex meaning, synthesizing elements related to
nondiscrimination, the impartiality of public authorities, the separation
between the state and religious beliefs, and even secularism or nonconfessionalism.
Words wander and, like stones on the road, they also suffer the wear
and erosion of use and time. On other occasions, the wear and tear is
simply the result of manipulation. But we cannot renounce them—
neither words nor the meanings they carry—because the word is a divine
gift. As the Spanish poet Blas de Otero reminds us, in the end, the word
is all we have left: “If I lost my voice in the bush/ . . . If I have suffered
thirst, hunger, all that was mine and proved to be nothing . . ./ if I opened
my lips until they were rent, I still have the word.”147

bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1996-0177
147. BLAS DE OTERO, En el Principio, in MEDIOBIOGRAFÍA: SELECCIÓN DE POEMAS
BIOGRÁFICOS 71 (1997).
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